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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal rate of seigniorage in an economy char-
acterized by bilateral trade and a tax-evading underground sector. Optimal
inflation depends on which sector, formal or underground, is more congested
with buyers. If the underground sector is more congested, the optimal in-
flation rate in Peru is about 42.69% per annum. This oﬀers a possible moti-
vation for the high rates of inflation observed in that country in the 1980s.
A policy that returns this economy to Friedman rule delivers a welfare loss
that is equivalent to a 14% drop in consumption for the representative house-
hold. If the formal sector is more congested however, optimal inflation falls
to 1.48%, close to the rate observed in 2005.
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1 Introduction
One of the traditional arguments advanced for positive inflation is that in the preva-
lence of a tax-evading underground economy, governments should rely heavily on
seigniorage financing. Regular taxes tend to shift economic activity underground
and are therefore distortionary. To reduce these distortions, the tax burden must
be spread over all goods and services, including the liquidity services that money
provides. Inflation tax is particularly convenient since it needs not be legislated.
In the presence of a tax-evading sector, the typical result is that Friedman rule is
not optimal. This paper provides strong micro foundations for the underground
economy. I show that the optimal rate of inflation can be far lower than the rates
proposed in the literature, even for countries with the same degree of tax evasion.
The working definition of the underground economy is that traders in this
sector evade taxes and that underground goods are of inferior quality.1 In terms of
magnitudes, the underground-to-formal sector output ratio is estimated to be about
8.8% in the US, 44% in Peru and 76% in Nigeria [Schneider and Enste (2000)]. The
question asked in this paper is as follows: What is the optimal rate of inflation
in an economy characterized by bilateral trade and a tax-evading underground
sector? To the best of my knowledge, there are three papers in the literature
that address the question of optimal inflation with underground production.2 All
three papers consider tax evasion in environments with centralized market clearing
1There is no universally accepted definition of the underground economy. For the purpose of
this paper, I focus on this narrow definition. Inferior quality can be interpreted to mean that
there are no legal guarantees protecting consumers of underground goods.
2See Nicolini (1998), Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) and Koreshkova (2006).
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using the Walrasian auctioneer. To the contrary, bilateral exchange (one-on-one
anonymous meetings between buyers and sellers) seems to be the more plausible
trade arrangement that facilitates tax evasion. Apart from being the natural way
to model tax evasion, this paper shows that the mechanism of bilateral trade can
have pivotal implications for the optimal rate of inflation. I find that under one
set of bilateral trade market conditions, which I explain shortly, the optimal rate
of inflation is high and comparable to some of the rates suggested in the literature.
Under a diﬀerent set of bilateral trade market conditions however, the optimal rate
of inflation is extremely low, even for an economy with the same output ratio.
In the environment examined, households have buyers. Some buyers are sent
to the formal market, while others are sent to the underground market. If under-
ground goods are of poor quality, a household sends relatively more buyers to the
formal market. Each household acts similarly and private interest overwhelms the
social optimum. There is a tendency for overcrowding of buyers in the formal sector
and trade opportunities become few for each buyer in this sector.3 If the inflation
rate increases, households try to spend money faster at current prices rather than
at future higher prices. They divert buyers to the underground market, where the
overcrowding of buyers is less. The turnover of goods in the underground market
increases and underground output increases relative to the formal sector. Since
inflation increases tax evasion, seigniorage financing becomes less attractive and
3This of course depends on the allocation of sellers as well. For a full description of how I
treat sellers, see section 2. Also, one can think of “fewer trade opportunities” as equivalent to a
lower probability of finding a match with a seller.
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the optimal rate of inflation is low compared to the literature. This result defies
conventional wisdom, which claims that in the presence of a significant tax-evading
sector, governments should resort to inflation tax.
On the other hand, if underground goods are of considerably good quality,
the underground market tends to be more crowded for underground buyers. In
response to higher inflation, buyers move to the “less-crowded” formal market to
spend money faster. Thus, inflation reduces tax evasion and seigniorage financing
becomes more attractive. The optimal inflation rate is high, as observed in some
poor countries.
For a given size of the underground economy, optimal inflation depends cru-
cially on market conditions. An environment with market crowding is essential
for generating this outcome. In particular, notice that the results are not driven
by the extrinsic quality of underground goods, but rather by diﬀerences in market
crowding. Compare the above analysis to an equivalent economy with Walrasian
market clearing, while retaining the assumption that underground goods are of
lower quality. In such an economy, higher inflation still brings higher urgency to
spend money. However, the distribution of goods from sellers to buyers is fully
and equally eﬃcient in both sectors, due to the Walrasian auctioneer in both sec-
tor markets. Money can thus be spent equally fast in both sectors and households
need not adjust buyer allocations in order to spend money faster. That is, inflation
on its own does not aﬀect the sectoral distribution of the economy, even though
underground goods are inferior. Since inflation does not increase nor decrease tax
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evasion, the optimal rate of inflation is unaﬀected. The crowding eﬀect is unique
to search models and is sometimes termed the “extensive margin” or the “market
congestion eﬀect”.
An interesting property of the results is that depending on the relative con-
gestion of the two sector markets, inflation can either increase or decrease the
underground economy. How does this compare with the literature? Koreshkova
(2006) introduced an environment in which credit services are produced solely in
the formal sector. Inflation causes agents to trade more with credit, thereby in-
creasing the formal sector at the expense of the underground sector. This approach
supports a negative relationship between changes in inflation and changes in un-
derground output. Although intuitively coherent, the data on the other hand is
far less conclusive. In Figure 4, I compare changes in inflation to changes in un-
derground output for several countries. There is very little if any such negative
correlation.4 Although there may exist an endogeneity problem, this only cements
the need for comprehensive modeling of the underground economy to investigate
the evidence.
In relation to Figure 4, the results in this paper can be interpreted as follows.
At a given point in time, two countries can take opposite positions on the relative
congestion of their formal and underground markets for buyers. Inflation hence
impacts their underground sectors in opposite directions. Secondly, over time, a
single country can switch states in the relative congestion of the two sector markets
4Regressing changes in inflation on changes in the output ratio generates coeﬃcients that are
statistically not diﬀerent from zero.
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for buyers. Thus, inflation moves underground output in reverse directions over
time. Putting these together, one can get data points that wrongly suggest no
relationship between changes in inflation and changes in the output ratio, similar
to Figure 4.
Wright (2005) identifies four major areas where the existing literature on micro
foundations of money needs further extension. Two of these are (i) extensions to
include fiscal policy variables to examine their interaction with monetary policy
and (ii) quantitative analysis to enable numerical policy proposals. This paper
makes a significant contribution towards the integration of elaborate schemes of
public finance into the monetary search literature, following recent progress by
Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2006). I show that these models are indeed com-
putable to generate numerical results that are relevant for policy. I build strong
micro foundations for the underground economy by including anonymity, which
directly motivates tax evasion. Finally, I show that the relative congestion of the
two sector markets is important for optimal inflation.
This paper adds to the monetary literature on the informal sector, alongside
Koreshkova (2006), Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) and Nicolini (1998). Optimal
policy in the presence of externalities follows fundamentals by Sandmo (1975).5
The next section presents a two-sector monetary search framework, replicating
properties of the underground-formal dichotomy. In section 3, I characterize the
model and describe the equilibrium. Section 4 derives the price and output ratios
5Also see Ng (1980), Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998).
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and examines how households adjust decisions when inflation changes. In section
5, I calibrate the model to data from Peru and present quantitative estimates of the
optimal inflation rate. Section 6 considers robustness and extensions. I conclude
in section 7.
2 Economic Environment
I extend the framework introduced by Shi (1999) to allow for two sectors, formal
and underground/informal. These are denoted by the subscripts f and i respec-
tively and are assumed to be on separate islands. Goods are perishable between
periods, irrespective of the sector in which they are produced. By this, I preclude
the emergence of commodity money. Self-produced goods yield no utility and
hence trade is essential for worthwhile consumption. Some of these restrictions are
standard in monetary search models, as they permit trade and an endogenous role
for fiat money.
Time is discrete, denoted t. Money is the sole state variable. The economy
is inhabited by a large number of anonymous and infinitely-lived agents who are
either buyers or sellers/producers. For tractability, I collect agents into decision-
making families or households.6 A household is constituted by the measure s of
sellers and b of buyers; s ∈ (0,∞), b ∈ (0, s]. For simplicity, sellers are allocated
6A related tractable environment proceeds with agents rather than households [see Lagos and
Wright (2005)]. Taber and Wallace (1999) and Zhou (1999) provide search models in which
individuals hold non-degenerate inventories of indivisible money. Molico (1998) presents a search
model with divisible money and goods without representative households.
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exogenously between sectors, with sf + si = s and sj ∈ (0, s), j = f, i. There
are a large number of households, and each household is infinitesimal compared
to the aggregate. The focus is on the representative household, who’s state and
choice variables are in lower-case letters. Capital-case variables represent those of
other households and the aggregate economy, which the representative household
takes as given. Economy-wide money supply is Mt, of which the representative
household has mt. There is no population growth; the number of households,
sellers and buyers being exogenous constants.
2.1 Market Congestion
The key mechanism driving the results in this paper is the potential for diﬀerences
in market congestion in the two sectors. Hence, I present this mechanism first.
Each household sends a fraction of its buyers to each sector market. Let Bjt and
Sj be the aggregate number of buyers and sellers entering market j, j = f, i. These
agents match one-on-one and may trade if the match is successful. A successful
match occurs when any buyer meets a seller from a household other than his own.
The total number of successful matches, Xjt, is derived from the matching function:
Xjt = BαjtS1−αj , α ∈ (0, 1) , j = f, i .
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Also, define Bjt and Sjt as:
Bjt = XjtBjt =
µ
Sj
Bjt
¶1−α
and
Sjt = XjtSj =
µ
Bjt
Sj
¶α
, j = f, i.
Then Bjt and Sjt are the average matching rates per buyer and per seller respec-
tively.7 These can also be interpreted as the market congestion rates for buyers
and sellers respectively. Since each household is infinitesimal, they take congestion
rates as given. The larger the number of buyers entering market j, the higher is the
market congestion for buyers in that sector and the fewer the trade opportunities
for each buyer in that sector.
Suppose there are more trade opportunities for each underground buyer than
for each formal buyer: Bit > Bft. In other words, the formal market is more
congested for buyers than the underground sector. Then, an increase in inflation
moves buyers to the less-congested underground market, given higher urgency to
spend money stocks. Buyers are moved underground to take advantage of better
trade opportunities there. On the aggregate level, the turnover of goods increase
underground relative to the formal sector. Since inflation can increase tax evasion,
seigniorage financing is unattractive and the optimal rate of inflation is low. The
opposite is the case when Bit < Bft. I focus on the market congestion rate for
7Note that BjtBjt = SjtSjt, j = f, i. Since it takes two to trade, one successfully matched
seller implies a successfully matched buyer. See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of
related matching functions.
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buyers only, since the allocation of sellers is exogenous.
2.2 Household’s Problem
Household agents are altruistic towards fellow members. Let Ut be instantaneous
utility from consumption, net of the disutility of production. Φ (Qjt) = Q
φ
jt, φ > 1
is the disutility of producing Qjt units inside a match. Also, let the pair {qjt, xjt}
be the terms of trade whenever the representative household’s buyers engage in
purchases and {Qjt,Xjt} when the sellers engage in sales. Here, qjt (or Qjt) is the
quantity to be traded and xjt (or Xjt) is the monetary payment in currency. The
terms of trade will be discussed later but for now, it suﬃce to take these values as
given. The household’s problem is:
v (mt) = max
bjt,mjt,mt+1,j=f,i
Ut + βEv (mt+1) , β ∈ (0, 1) ,
subject to the terms of trade as well as:
Ut = cft + ηcit − sfSftΦ (Qft)− siSitΦ (Qit) , (1)
cft = (1− τ) bftBftqft −Qgt , (2)
cit = bitBitqit , (3)
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bft + bit ≤ b , (4)
mft +mit ≤ mt , (5)
mt+1 −mt ≤ sfSftXft + siSitXit + PtQgt − bftBftxft − bitBitxit , (6)
mjt, xjt, cjt, bjt ≥ 0 , j = f, i and mt ≥ 0 ∀t.
Given the market congestion rates, total successful matches for household agents
sent to market j are bjtBjt for buyers and sjSjt for sellers. Total purchases are
thus bjtBjtqjt, while total disutility is sjSjtΦ (Qjt), j = f, i. In (1), formal and
underground goods are perfect substitutes in consumption but underground goods
may be of inferior quality: η ≤ 1.8 I define composite consumption as ct = cft+ηcit,
where cjt is consumption of sector j goods. A fraction, τ , of formal sector purchases
is paid as a commodity tax. Also, the government buys oﬀ the quantity Qgt from
formal buyers and pays for these units by printing money. Due to perishability,
the household consumes all goods instantly. In (6), incoming funds from sales, Xjt,
arrive simultaneously as outgoing funds, xjt, during purchases. Hence the former
cannot be used to finance the latter within the same period. Nominal income
from sales to the government is PtQ
g
t , where Pt is the per-unit price paid by the
government.
[ Figure 1 ]
8An alternative formulation is to consider η as representing a less-eﬃcient production tech-
nology in the underground sector.
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I specify the timing of events next. Starting a period with money holdings
mt, the representative household makes decisions on the allocation of buyers and
money. The household also instructs its buyers and sellers on the terms of trade,
which include the oﬀers to make and those to accept in all successful matches.
Next, the markets open. Formal agents visit only the formal market while informal
agents go to the underground market. Once in the market, agents match one-on-
one according to the matching function. Anonymity forbids credit transactions
and trade is quid pro quo. After a bargain is reached, a successfully matched seller
produces the desired output and trade is then finalized. As markets close, goods
exiting the formal market gates are all taxed. Each formal buyer compulsorily
sells some quantity Qgt to the government and receives money. Agents return to
their respective households where purchased goods and sales receipts are gathered.
There is consumption and the period ends.
2.3 Terms of Trade
Notice that the terms of trade, {qjt, xjt}, essentially establishes the per-unit price,
pjt, which is implied by pjt =
xjt
qjt
, j = f, i. After the money and buyer allocations, a
representative buyer enters his assigned market j with mjtbjt units of money, j = f, i.
In each successful match, trade can occur if the oﬀer is acceptable to both sides. For
each implementable oﬀer, monetary payments cannot exceed the buyer’s money
holding upon entering the match: xjt ≤ mjtbjt , j = f, i. This feasibility constraint is
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intrinsic to the environment, given that trade is quid pro quo.9
Let ωt (or Ωt) be the value of money. Then, for an oﬀer to be accepted, it must
satisfy the seller’s individual rationality constraint. This is simply xjtΩt ≥ Φ (qjt),
j = f, i. In both sectors, I allow buyers to hold all the bargaining power and to
make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Optimal oﬀers ensure that the individual rationality
constraint holds with equality. Combined with the feasibility constraint, we have:
mjt
bjt
≥ Φ (qjt)
Ωt
, j = f, i . (7)
Inequality (7) is named the cash-and-carry constraint and is the final constraint
on the household’s problem.
Sellers act as “oﬀer takers” and take the quantity requested as given. Tem-
porarily assume that money is valued, allowing the cash-and-carry constraint to
bind in both sectors. Then one can rewrite the level of output-per-trade in each
sector as:
qjt =
∙
mjt
bjt
Ωt
¸ 1
φ
, j = f, i . (8)
With quantities determined, the quantity-per-trade ratio, qitqft , can be readily de-
rived. I return to this later.
To summarize, the terms of trade is simply xjt = Xjt =
mjt
bjt
and qjt (= Qjt)
9Market clearing models of the underground economy are useful due to the ease of incorporat-
ing credit. For ways to include credit in models with anonymous agents, see Berentsen, Camera
and Waller (2005).
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given by (8). Having established this, I next address the price Pt which the gov-
ernment pays for goods. I allow formal sector agents to charge a premium on all
sales to the government to take account of matching costs. Specifically, I assume
Pt =
pft
Xft .
2.4 Government
The definition of a sector as “underground” suggests the existence of an authority
that makes this distinction. There is a centralized government that implements
both monetary and fiscal policies. Money supply, Mt per capita household, grows
at the rate γ per period. There is no government debt. Instead, newly printed
money, (γ − 1)Mt, is used by the government in the market as payment for Qgt .
That is, Qgt is real seigniorage income. The real government budget constraint is:
G = τbftBftqft +Qgt , (9)
where G is an exogenous expenditure each period. Since part of government rev-
enues are nominal while expenditure is real, the government faces a liquidity con-
straint much like private households. Following Cooley and Hansen (1991),
(γ − 1)Mt = PtQgt . (10)
Note that the money growth rate and tax rate are endogenous. Consider a
reduction in τ . The government’s liquidity constraint goes into deficits as consis-
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tent with the optimal region of the Laﬀer curve. This requires an adjustment in
transfers to supply the funds necessary to alleviate the fiscal position, which in
turn changes γ. Thus, (9) and (10) emphasize the inherent interaction between
the fiscal and monetary policy variables τ and γ.
3 Characterizing the equilibrium
This section examines the euler conditions that characterizes the equilibrium. Let
λjt, j = f, i, be the Lagrange multiplier on the cash-and-carry constraint in each
successful match. mjt is chosen such that the cash-and-carry constraint binds to
an equal extent in expectation in each sector: Bfλft = Biλit. The implied euler
condition for money is:
ωt
β
= ωt+1 + Bjt+1λjt+1 , j = f, i . (11)
Money kept between periods delivers its discounted value in the next period as well
as helps alleviate the cash-and-carry constraint in future trade matches. From (11),
it can be shown that both cash-and-carry constraints bind in all successful matches
in equilibrium if the return on money is suﬃciently low: γ > β. From this point
on, I assume this to be the case.
Next, I turn to the optimal quantity of output that is demanded in each trade
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match. The associated first order conditions are derived as:
1− τ = λft
Φ (qft)
Ωt
φ
qft
+ ωt
dxft
dqft
and (12)
η = λit
Φ (qit)
Ωt
φ
qit
+ ωt
dxit
dqit
. (13)
Demanding a higher quantity yields marginal utility from the additional units.
The marginal cost is incurred at two levels. At the buyer level, demanding a larger
quantity requires of the buyer to pay more money, thus making the corresponding
cash-and-carry constraint more binding. The rate at which this constraint becomes
more binding depends on how much is required to motivate the seller to deliver the
additional quantity, which in turn depends on the seller’s production disutility costs
on the margin. Secondly, as buyers purchase higher quantities from the market
and need more money to do so, the household is pressured to deliver more money
to its buyers. This causes the liquidity constraint (6) to become more binding.
The first order condition for bft is given as:
Bft
∙
(1− τ) qft − λft
Φ (qft)
Ωt
− ωtxft
¸
= Bit
∙
ηqit − λit
Φ (qit)
Ωt
− ωtxit
¸
. (14)
Allocating more buyers to the formal sector generates more formal sector purchases
and yields the associated marginal benefits in consumption utility. All things being
equal, as more buyers visit the formal sector, mftbft declines and the cash-and-carry
constraint binds further in this sector. The household is pressured to deliver more
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money to formal sector buyers, causing the liquidity constraint to become more
binding as well. A similar eﬀect pertains to the underground sector. For the
marginal buyer, the net benefits must be equal between sectors in expectation.10
All households are alike and so I apply symmetry as usual. The only state
variable is money. To proceed to describe an equilibrium therefore, it is essential
to ensure that this variable evolves at a constant rate. Assuming a fixed inflation
rate γ, the euler condition for money holding in steady state reduces to:
λjt =
γ − β
βBj Ωt , j = f, i .
Substituting this into (12) to (14) gives (15) to (17) below.
3.1 The Equilibrium
Definition 1 A symmetric monetary search equilibrium is defined as the inflation
rate γ, the set of household choices (bf ,mft)
∞
t=0 and the implied value of money
(ωt)
∞
t=0 such that given τ , the following requirements are met: (i) each household
solves its optimization problem; (ii) the representative household’s variables repli-
cate the aggregate equivalents; (iii) prices are positive, though bounded (the value
of money is positive and bounded); and (iv) the government budget balances.
In particular, an equilibrium involves a solution to a system of four equations
10The matching rates Bft and Bit can be interpreted in terms of probabilities.
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for bf , mft, ωt and γ:
1− τ =
∙
1 +
γ − β
βBf
¸
Ωt
mft
bf
φ
qf
, (15)
η =
∙
1 +
γ − β
βBi
¸
Ωt
mit
bi
φ
qi
, (16)
mit
bi
mft
bf
=
γ − β + βBf
γ − β + βBi , (17)
G = τbfBfqf + (γ − 1)MtPt . (18)
Variables without the time subscript represent equilibrium real values. Those with
time subscripts are nominal values that depend on the money stock at date t.
Given τ , there exists an equilibrium. The equations (15), (16) and (17) deliver
values for the household variables bf , mft and ωt, all in terms of γ. The required
inflation rate that balances the budget, given τ , is then derived from (18). All
other variables - such as qj, cj, Bj, λjt, xjt, pjt and Pt - can be derived as functions
of the four in the definition.
Equation (17) plays a central role in understanding the implications of the
model. First, the sector with the higher buyer congestion rate always has the higher
money holding per buyer. If market congestion is worse for formal buyers, each is
compensated with higher sums of money. In other words, if Bf < Bi, households
take advantage of the intensive margin when buying from the formal sector and
the extensive margin when buying underground goods. Secondly, suppose there is
an increase in γ, with Bf < Bi. All things being equal, more money is diverted to
17
underground buyers per capita and qit increases relative to qft. That is, the erosive
eﬀect of inflation on household money stock increases tax evasion and seigniorage
financing becomes less attractive. The reverse is the case when market congestion
is worse for buyers in the undergroundmarket. A discussion of the eﬀect of inflation
follows in the next section.
4 Size, Prices and Inflation
The quantity-per-trade ratio describes trade within an underground match relative
to a formal sector match and is denoted RI = qiqf . Summing over all such trade
encounters in each sector gives the aggregate output ratio in trades involving all
household buyers. This is denoted R = biBiqitbfBfqft . The subscript I is used to denote
the intensive margin.
4.1 Relative Quantities and Relative Price
Since the cash-and-carry constraint binds in both sectors, (8) gives the quantity-
per-trade in each sector. Using this outcome together with (17), the equilibrium
quantity-per-trade ratio becomes:
RI =
∙
γ − β (1− Bf)
γ − β (1− Bi)
¸ 1
φ
,
which completely describes the intensive margin. The intensive margin concerns
the quantity traded within each successful match, which depends on the amount
18
of money each buyer takes into a match. If the formal market is congested for
buyers, households take advantage of each successful formal match to acquire large
quantities, which implies the expense of higher sums of money in formal matches
compared to underground matches. In other words, high market congestion for
formal buyers reduces the intensive ratio.11
Next, the aggregate trades equivalent is:
R =
biBi
bfBfRI ≡
si
sf
∙
η
1− τ
¸ α
1−α
R
1
1−α
I , (19)
which is the underground-to-formal sector output ratio. Comparing with the inten-
sive ratio, R stresses the eﬀect of the matching rate on aggregate market outcomes.
Suppose RI is given. Then for the representative buyer sent to each island, the
congestion of the underground market relative to the formal market, BiBf , deter-
mines the quantity of expected purchases by an underground buyer relative to a
formal buyer: BiBfRI . Preference and policy parameters η and τ are reflected in R
because households are mindful of the eﬀect of their buyer allocation decisions on
the eventual mix of goods that they consume. Given the bargaining outcome and
market congestion conditions, households employ their buyer allocation decision
to edge closer to their preferred mix of goods. The allocation of buyers and its
eﬀect on market congestion and aggregate trade outcomes is termed the extensive
margin. This margin is conclusively captured by R and a search model is essential
11One can consider the eﬀect of technology as another dimension of the intensive margin.
Superior technology in the formal sector means that even with equal financial compensation,
formal sector sellers can deliver higher quantities within each trade meeting.
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for separating R from RI .
Price in each transaction as determined from the terms of trade is pjt =
mjt
bj
1
qj
,
j = f, i in equilibrium. Using (17), the relative price ratio in private trades reduces
to pitpft =
1
RI
mit
bi
/mftbf , or:
pit
pft
=
∙
γ − β (1− Bf)
γ − β (1− Bi)
¸1− 1φ
. (20)
Similar to (19), the relative price is not only a function of preferences and taxes but
also an endogenous outcome of monetary policy, unlike in the earlier papers. With
relatively high market congestion for formal buyers, each brings more money into
a match and this increases the formal sector price relative to that underground. If
Bi < Bf , it is possible to generate higher prices in the underground sector. It is
worth noting however that pft is price before taxes. The eﬀective price ratio after
tax is pitpft (1− τ), which I report in section 5.
The ratio R has been the subject of virtually all of what is known in the
literature on underground economy. The environment presented above enables us
to use published empirical estimates of R and back out the micro level ratio RI as
well as the price ratio pitpft (1− τ) as demonstrated. Some of these results may be
particularly useful since empirically, micro level data is unattainable in studies on
the underground economy.
20
4.2 Eﬀect of Inflation
In this subsection, I assume that monetary injections are via lump sum transfers
to households and also that dτdγ = 0.
12 In the equivalent case in Cavalcanti and
Villamil (2003) as well as Nicolini (1998), firms and households do not adjust
portfolios when inflation increases. In particular, inflation has no eﬀect on sectoral
allocations. dRdγ
¯¯¯
τ
is strictly negative in Koreshkova (2006) since inflation causes
agents to use more credit, which is exclusively produced in the oﬃcial sector. In
the model proposed however:
dRI
dγ
¯¯¯¯
τ
= [Bi − Bf + ϕ] RIA
by quotient rule, where
A =
φ
β
[γ − β + βBf ] [γ − β + βBi] and
ϕ = [γ − β + βBi] dBfdγ
¯¯¯¯
τ
− [γ − β + βBf ] dBidγ
¯¯¯¯
τ
.
Notice that Bj > 0 ∀bj ∈ [0, b] and hence A > 0 ∀γ ≥ β. Secondly, dBfdγ
¯¯¯
τ
> 0
and dBidγ
¯¯¯
τ
< 0 whenever Bi − Bf > 0 and vice versa. Thus, ϕ is a function of
the same sign as Bi − Bf . Assume that underground buyers have better match-
ing success: Bi − Bf > 0. When γ increases, households seek to spend nominal
balances faster and they divert some buyers from the formal market to the less con-
12Specifically, government simply hands money to each buyer, instead of requesting Qgt units
of output. For now, ignore the eﬀect on the government budget.
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gested underground market, as consistent with (17). Since bi increases, dBidγ
¯¯¯
τ
< 0
and the household compensates each underground buyer with more money per
capita, which increases RI . Since bi increases, aggregate matches, biBi, increase
underground relative to the formal sector. The eﬀect on the extensive ratio R is
therefore in the same direction as RI .
Even with dτdγ = 0, monetary policy aﬀects the relative price. If Bi − Bf > 0,
the underground price level rises relative to the formal sector price as the rate of
inflation increases. Again, by quotient rule:
d pitpft
dγ
¯¯¯¯
¯
τ
= [Bi − Bf + ϕ] (φ− 1)
pit
pft
A
.
Intuitively, increased inflation implies that each underground buyer starts to hold
more money compared to previously (if Bi − Bf > 0). Thus, underground buyers
begin to demand higher quantities in each trade. They need to pay higher prices
to motivate the additional units, owing to the convex cost of production (φ > 1).
This change in the relative price implies a marginal decline in RI , however this
eﬀect is of second order and does not reverse the initial rise in RI and R. When
Bi − Bf < 0, the relative size and relative price ratios respond in the opposite
direction of the corresponding eﬀect above as inflation increases.
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4.3 The Ramsey Problem (Optimal Inflation)
Bailey (1956) and Phelps (1973) brought the subject of optimal inflation into the
fold of public finance. In this seminal contribution, Phelps advocates for a positive
tax on the liquidity services that money provides if taxes on other goods and
services are distortionary. This argument favours a positive nominal interest rate,
or simply, positive inflation. Tax distortions are socially costly while inflation
presents the usual welfare consequences. The task facing a benevolent government
is to find the best trade-oﬀ between the deadweight loss from tax financing and
that from seigniorage financing.
I focus on the Ramsey problem that seeks to find the optimal mix of con-
sumption and inflation taxes when government can commit to the announced pol-
icy. Without money, the cash-and-carry constraint (7) cannot be satisfied and
the economy described degenerates into autarky. Following Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989), money acts as an intermediate commodity that facilitates trade. Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971) established a general result emphasizing the undesirability of
taxing the intermediate goods sector when all final goods and services fall under
the tax radar. In application to monetary economics, their conclusion implies that
inflationary tax should not be used despite the distortions caused by taxes on the
final goods sector.13 However, where there is a third sector - the underground
economy - that evades regular taxes, the optimal policy set may include positive
13Also, see Kimbrough (1986), Faig (1988), Guidotti and Vegh (1992), Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1996).
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seigniorage.
The formalized Ramsey problem is to solve the household’s problem subject to
the government’s budget constraints and the first order conditions in section (3).
Let the variables with tildes represent the Ramsey allocations:
nebf , emft, eqf , eqio.
The required inflation and tax rates are respectively:
eγ = β + β " emitebi − emftebf
#−1 " eBf emftebf − eBi emitebi
#
and (21)
eτ = G− (eγ − 1)Mt/ ePtebf eBfeqf . (22)
Market clearing models of the underground economy have commonly used credit
to establish reasons why Friedman rule is suboptimal. Even in the absence of
credit, search frictions rule out any possibility that Friedman rule may be optimal,
except for the special case where market congestion rates are equal between the
two sectors. From (17), one can show that second term on the right hand side of
(21) is non-negative. First, hmithbi =
hmft
hbf
whenever eBf = eBi. Further, when eBf 6= eBi,
hmit
hbi
− hmfthbf and
eBf hmfthbf − eBi hmithbi are of the same sign, in which case the second term
is strictly positive.
The trade-oﬀ between taxes and inflation in the presence of congestion ex-
ternalities warrants further explanation. In the typical environment with market
clearing and evadable taxes, optimal policy considers (i) real distortions created by
formal sector taxes and (ii) the welfare cost of inflation. Assume that the implied
optimal policy set in this case is the pair {eτa, eγa}. The additional dimension pro-
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vided in the framework with bilateral exchange is that there is a role for inflation
in correcting any imbalances in market congestion rates in the two sectors.14
The Trade-oﬀ with market congestion - Case 1
To illustrate, suppose sellers are distributed evenly between the two sectors.
Then, to minimize search frictions and maximize aggregate matches, buyers must
also be allocated equally between sectors. Suppose instead that the allocation of
buyers is skewed towards the underground sector, causing high market congestion
for buyers in that sector. The optimal policy set includes low taxes: eτ 1 < eτa and
high seigniorage: eγ1 > eγa. Low taxes edge buyers back into the formal market and
improves the coordination problem.
In this illustration, two factors account for the negative relationship between τ
and γ. The first is the traditional argument that as γ increases, seigniorage income
rises, which finances the government and helps reduce τ . The second is that as
γ increases, buyers move to the formal sector via the extensive margin in order
to spend money faster. Thus, more goods become taxable, which also means the
tax rate can adjust downwards even further. For both of these factors, dτdγ < 0
when the underground market has the higher market congestion for buyers. Apart
from the trade-oﬀ between distortionary taxes and the welfare cost of inflation, the
Ramsey problem also seeks to even out market congestion rates in the two sectors
and improve the coordination problem.
14For more on second best taxation in environments with externalities, see Sandmo (1975), Ng
(1980), Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998).
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The Trade-oﬀ with market congestion - Case 2
When the market is more congested for formal buyers, the trade-oﬀ between
these two taxes is less clear. Consider a marginal reduction in inflation. Seigniorage
incomes decline, but tax revenues increase even with no change to the tax rate.
This is because buyers return to the congested formal market, given a lower urgency
to spend money. Depending on the influx of buyers into the formal market, the
rise in tax revenues can outweigh losses in seigniorage income. That is, marginal
reductions in τ also become aﬀordable. In summary, lower inflation and a lower
tax rate are jointly feasibly: dτdγ > 0.
15
If government can lower the welfare cost of inflation (by lowering γ) and at
the same time lower tax distortions (by lowering τ), then is Friedman rule opti-
mal? Not necessarily, because of market congestion. Since Bf < Bi, lower taxes
and lower inflation both have the same eﬀect of moving buyers to the congested
formal market. Thus, for low-enough levels of γ and τ , too many buyers enter
the already-crowded formal market and the coordination problem worsens. This
hinders aggregate trade and reduces welfare. Optimal policy includes {eτ 2, eγ2} such
that eτ 1 < eτ 2 < eτa and eγ2 < eγa, but this does not guarantee that Friedman rule
becomes optimal. In this case as well, the Ramsey problem finds optimal policy
after considering not only tax distortions and the welfare cost of inflation, but also
market congestion.
15The analysis here is aimed at explaining our simulation results as in section 5, for the case
where Bf < Bi. See the upper right panel of Figure 3.
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5 Calibration and Results
This section calibrates the model to match data from Peru and identifies the op-
timal rate of inflation. I normalize the number of sellers, s, to unity. Using time
diary data, Juster and Staﬀord (1991) estimate that US residents spend on average
23.9 hours on paid work and 6.8 hours shopping per week. b is set to 6.8
23.9 . This
value is adopted for Peru, but considered a lower bound for time spent shopping
in that country.16
[ Table 1 ]
Data on tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is retrieved from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. The average for 2000 to 2004
is used to represent τ . Also collected from the same database is average annual
CPI inflation for 2000 to 2005, which is used to represent γ12 − 1. Finally, an
estimate of the underground-to-formal sector output ratio is taken from Schneider
and Enste (2000) and used to represent R.
Specifically, the equations I calibrate are (15) to (19). Temporarily assume
that we know sf (and hence si). Then, given the above values for τ , G, γ, b, β
and α, equations (15) to (18) are used to get bf , mft, ωt and Qg. The remaining
requirement is to verify sf . The model is simulated for the value sf such that the
relative size of the underground economy, R, equals 0.44, as consistent with (19).
16The appendix includes sensitivity analysis on b, φ and α.
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This completes the calibration.17
For the first case, I assume that underground goods are just as good as for-
mal sector goods: η = 1. In Table 2, households send relatively more buyers to
the underground sector, causing high market congestion for underground buyers
(Bi < Bf). Each underground buyer is handed a relatively high sum of money:
mit
mt
> bib . Since each underground buyer holds more money per capita, they can
buy more units and the intensive margin ensures that RI > 1. In order to match
the output ratio of R = .44, I assign suﬃciently few sellers to the underground
market. The value of sf derived is retained for all other simulations for this first
case. For each policy set fed into the model, (19) is then used to evaluate the new
level of R, given sf constant.
[ Table 2 ]
For the second case, I assume that η = .85. Market congestion is reversed, with
the formal sector being more congested for buyers. Market congestion is lower
for each underground buyer, requiring lower money allocation to these buyers:
mit
mt
< bib . Since each underground buyer bears lower money stocks, they buy fewer
units per capita compared to formal buyers and RI < 1. Here again, the model
is simulated to deliver sf such that R = .44. The value of sf derived is retained
for all other simulations for this second case. The quantity Qg is real government
revenue from seigniorage spending. The values are however small compared to the
17For the sake of comparison, I also calibrate the US economy for which data is collected
similarly and from the same sources, with R = .088, τ = .1073 and γ12 = 1.028262.
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total government budget, G.
5.1 Optimal Inflation Tax
The optimal policy set is in Table 3. It is important to note that the higher optimal
inflation recommended for the economy with η = 1 is not because that economy has
higher tax evasion. In fact, in both economies, I start oﬀ with R = 0.44 as shown
in Table 2. Instead, the economy with η = 1 has higher optimal inflation because
of higher market congestion for buyers in the underground market. Inflation does
not only bring seigniorage income, it also reduces tax evasion as buyers start to
take advantage of lower market congestion in the formal market. This acts as
an additional incentive for seigniorage financing and explains the optimal rate of
42.69% in Peru. This result is robust for marginally inferior underground goods:
η = 1 − ε; ε being an arbitrarily small positive number. That is, inflation can
increase the consumption of higher-quality formal sector goods. This result is
new, and opposite to that found in Peterson and Shi (2004), where inflation causes
households to compromise on the quality of goods they consume. In this case
seigniorage contributing significantly to the government budget.
[ Table 3 ] 18
18For diﬀerent configurations of relative credit-use, Nicolini (1998) finds optimal annual interest
rates between 7.34% and 19.17%. In Table 3, I convert these estimates into inflation rates using
the Fisher equation as in section 6. The tax rate in that paper is calibrated diﬀerently and not
compared. For an economy with 40% output ratio, Koreshkova (2006) estimates the optimal rate
of inflation to be approximately 60% per annum. Her base economy is calibrated to US data and
hence the tax rates are also not comparable.
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On the other hand, when the congestion of buyers is higher in the formal
sector, inflation increases R, which acts as a disincentive to seigniorage financing.
The optimal inflation rate here is 1.48%, despite the large tax-evading sector. In
Figure 3, seigniorage income (Qg/G) rises with γ, as consistent with models with
centralized markets. Given G, seigniorage helps alleviate tax financing. However,
as γ increases, buyers exit the formal market in search for better matching rates
underground (Bi > Bf). The turnover of taxable goods decline, along with tax
revenues, at the going tax rate. Tax revenues decline at a rate faster than the
gains from seigniorage, requiring τ to rise.
[ Figure 2 ]
[ Figure 3 ]
The large variation in optimal inflation is not driven by diﬀerences in the quality
of goods but rather by diﬀerences in market congestion. In the equivalent economy
with market clearing, inflation on its own does not alter the extent of tax evasion,
irrespective of the relative quality of underground goods. The optimal rate of
inflation is hence unaﬀected.
To better understand the welfare implications of the simulations, I define the
index:
%∆cγ =
Uβ − Uγ
cβ
× 100% .
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Uγ is the instantaneous return to the household [see equation (1)] in an equilibrium
with inflation rate γ, using a corresponding tax rate that balances the government
budget. Similarly, cβ is the composite consumption level at γ = β. Starting from
Friedman rule, the value %∆cγ denotes the proportional increase in consumption
required to compensate the representative household for the transition to a new
equilibrium with γ > β.19 In Table 3, the diﬀerence in the welfare eﬀects of
inflation in the two cases is accounted for by (i) the size of the optimal inflation
rate in each case, which aﬀects the extent to which the coordination problem is
corrected and (ii) the change in tax distortions that is achieved via the adjustment
to the new tax rate.
In the first case (η = 1), I compare the optimal policy [{eγ = 42.69%,eτ = 9.98%}
and the results in the first column of Table 3] to the actual policy [{γ = 2.24%, τ =
12.71%} and its associated results in the first column of Table 2]. High optimal
inflation goes a long way to (i) improve the coordination problem (reduce |Bf − Bi|)
as well as (ii) reduce tax distortions due to lower taxes. The combined eﬀect is
such that a reduction in inflation from this optimal value down to Friedman rule
requires %∆cγ = −14.09%.
In the second case (η = .85), optimal policy [{eγ = 1.48%,eτ = 12.47%}] is
compared to the actual [{γ = 2.24%, τ = 12.71%}] in the same fashion. Since the
optimal inflation rate is lower than the actual, this (i) worsens the coordination
problem by increasing |Bf − Bi|. However, buyers return to the congested formal
19Benabou (1991) reconclines a related index of the welfare eﬀects of inflation to the area under
the real money demand function.
31
market given less urgency to spend money, thereby increasing the volume of goods
under the tax radar. As this happens, a tax rate marginally lower than the actual
becomes feasible, thus (ii) reducing tax distortions. The net eﬀect of these two
accounts for %∆cγ = −.049%.
The results are worth comparing with those in Nicolini (1998), also calibrated to
Peru. Nicolini considers an economy in which an exogenous segment of the formal
sector commodity space has trade conducted only with credit, while another seg-
ment has trade strictly with cash. A mutually exclusive set of goods are produced
in a tax-evading underground sector and traded only with cash. Over-reliance
on tax financing widens the tax burden between the formal-cash goods and the
underground-cash goods sectors. On the other hand, over-reliance on seigniorage
financing widens the tax burden between the formal-credit and formal-cash goods
sectors. Optimal policy employs a mix of both sources of financing. For diﬀer-
ent relative sizes of the formal-credit sector, he documents variations in optimal
inflation in the range shown in Table 3.
The results in this paper show that even without any assumptions regarding
credit-use, there can be large variations in the optimal rate of inflation if trade is
decentralized. This is against evidence provided by Besley and Levenson (1996),
which calls to question the role played by credit. They document a high prevalence
of Rotating Saving and Credit Associations in Taiwan, allowing informal sector
agents access to financial intermediation. Participation rates were found to be as
high as 45% at the highest income percentile, which is significant compared to
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the relative size of the underground economy. The micro foundations of money
alone can explain why Friedman rule fails to be optimal. Augmenting the current
framework with credit can lead to higher optimal rates of inflation, perhaps close
to estimates found in Koreshkova (2006). Her paper finds that a country with 40%
underground economy, the optimal rate of inflation is about 60% per annum. In
contrast, decentralized market conditions can instead support high or low inflation
rates even for closely similar rates of tax evasion.
6 Discussion
The economic environment examined is directly equivalent to one in which house-
holds interact with a centralized market for government bonds. Augmenting
the household’s liquidity constraint with bonds, the euler condition for bonds is
ωt
β = ωt+1 (1 + rt+1), where rt is the net nominal interest rate. Comparing this
euler condition with (11), the interest rate is derived as:
rt = Bf λftωt = Bi
λit
ωt
≡ γ − β
β
.
Friedman rule involves setting γ to β, or alternatively, rt to zero.
In the environment studied, the allocation of sellers between sectors is exoge-
nous. The configuration {sf , si} is nevertheless consistent with the equilibrium.
Due to take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by buyers, sellers exit each trade match with zero
net surplus in both sectors. Households are therefore indiﬀerent in the allocation
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of sellers between sectors when I endogenize the seller allocation decision. Using
(12) and (13), it is easy to show that the first order condition for sft holds true
for all values of sft ∈ [0, s]. The result is an infinite set of equilibria, including the
point {sf , si} used in section 2. Employing Nash bargaining may narrow the set
of equilibria. Such an extension is likely to strengthen the results discussed in this
paper. I conjecture that in response to changes in the inflation rate, sellers are
likely to move in the same direction as buyers, further strengthening the results
on the extensive margin.
This paper generate endogenous micro level trade ratios including the quantity-
per-trade ratio and the relative price. A somewhat related paper in the literature is
McLaren (1998). He considers a non-monetary economy with markets for imported
goods. There are several markets, each for a specific class of imported goods.
Depending on the tax rate and the concentration of tax inspectors in a given
market, traders decide either to import legally and pay the associated taxes or
to smuggled at a risk of detection. Quantity per importer is fixed and only the
choice of sector is endogenously influenced by policy. In equilibrium, traders in the
market for a particular class of good are all simultaneously legitimate importers or
all smugglers. This is an outcome of market clearing. Although separate prices can
be derived for the two sectors, only one is operational for each commodity class.
He then studied the optimal tax and audit rates in a Ramsey-type equilibrium.
The current paper on the other hand endogenizes production quantities, prices
and sector choice, and these depend on fundamentals as well as economic policy,
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including money.
A possible extension is to introduce capital into the environment examined in
this paper. First, notice that the model presented above can be interpreted as one
with constant returns to scale production technology involving labour: qjt = ljt,
j = f, i, where ljt is labour input. In this case, the disutility of production reverts
to disutility of labour: Φ (ljt). The introduction of capital simply involves employ-
ing a more general production function and an appropriate capital accumulation
equation. This extension will facilitate interesting dynamic and business cycle ap-
plications. One is however compelled to take a stand on which good(s), formal or
underground, can be accumulated into capital, if not both. How exactly are they
combined in the constitution of a uniform capital stock?
7 Conclusion
There are two main conclusions to draw from this paper. First, the data fails to
support the conventional wisdom that higher inflation strictly reduces the size of
the underground economy. There are data points for which decreases (increases) in
the underground-to-formal sector output ratio were indeed accompanied by higher
(lower) inflation. However, there are just as many data points that instead suggest
the reverse. I develop a theoretical framework that explains the evidence. The
solution I propose is that the relative congestion of the formal and underground
markets for buyers can be diﬀerent across countries. Where the formal market
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is more congested for buyers, inflation causes households to compromise on the
quality of goods they consume and commit more money and more buyers to the
underground sector. In this case, underground output increases both on the inten-
sive and extensive margins relative to the formal sector. When the underground
sector is more congested for buyers, inflation achieves the opposite result. In short,
inflation can move underground output in both directions, as consistent with the
data.
The second conclusion is as follows. In the presence of an underground sec-
tor, tax distortions are socially costly while inflation presents the usual welfare
consequences. If both sector markets are characterized by Walrasian market clear-
ing, the task facing a benevolent government is to find the best trade-oﬀ between
the deadweight loss from tax financing and that from seigniorage financing. With
bilateral trade however, optimal policy also seeks to correct the coordination prob-
lem that exists when market congestion is unbalanced between sectors. When the
underground market is more congested for buyers, the benevolent government re-
duces the formal sector tax rate to encourage buyers back into the formal sector.
Optimal policy thus involves high seigniorage financing and low taxes. I find op-
timal inflation rates as high as 42.69% per annum for Peru. Although this rate
is lower than the rates observed in that country from the mid 1970s to the mid
1990s, it does oﬀer a general explanation for the high rates of inflation in some
poor countries within the context of optimal public finance policy.
When the formal sector is more congested for buyers, optimal policy seeks to
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reduce the overcrowding of buyers in the formal sector to improve the coordination
problem. This requires high taxes combined with low seigniorage spending. For the
relevant configuration of the model, I generate an optimal annual inflation rate of
1.48% for Peru, which is close to the rate observed in that country in 2005. In Peru,
the size of underground output relative to the formal sector is estimated at 44%.
With such high rates of tax evasion, a familiar assertion in the literature calls for
high reliance on seigniorage financing. Further, Cooley and Hansen (1991) showed
quantitatively that when inflation tax revenue is replaced by revenue from other
distortionary taxes, the welfare eﬀect is negative. The results in this paper show
that the optimal inflation rate can be far lower than suggested in the literature,
even though formal sector taxes are distortionary.
The results in this paper must not be taken to imply that within the range
of low to high inflation, only the extreme policies are optimal. The environment
examined ignores other important considerations for inflation tax, including the
cost of administering alternative forms of taxation, the availability of other stores
of value apart from money and the redistributive implications of inflation. On
the theory front, I make significant inroads in integrating fiscal policy instruments
into the literature on the micro foundations of money. I showed that the model
is adaptable for the inclusion of capital, thus allowing the familiar dynamic and
business cycle analysis. The environment proposed is flexible and permits appli-
cations to other sectoral divisions of the economy such as manufacturing versus
services. Instead of matters concerning two-sector economies, further extensions
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may consider two-country applications.
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Appendix
The household solves:
v (mt) = max
bjt,mjt,qjt,mt+1,j=f,i
cft + ηcit − sfSftΦ (Qft)− siSitΦ (Qit)
+βEv (mt+1) + bftBftλft
∙
mft
bft
− Φ (qft)
Ωt
¸
+ bitBitλit
∙
mit
bit
− Φ (qit)
Ωt
¸
+ωt [mt + sfSftXft + PtQgt + siSitXit − bftBftxft − bitBitxit −mt+1] .
The Euler conditions (11) to (14) follow direct from the above set-up. (15), (16)
and (17) are arrived at as follows. First, note that if money is valued, λjt ≥ 0,
j = f, i and hence xjt =
Φ(qjt)
Ωt
, with dxjtdqjt =
Φ(qjt)
Ωt
φ
qjt
, j = f, i. This substituted into
(12), (13) and (14) yield:
1− τ = [λft + ωt]
Φ (qft)
Ωt
φ
qft
,
η = [λit + ωt]
Φ (qit)
Ωt
φ
qit
and
Bf
∙
(1− τ) qft − (λft + ωt)
Φ (qft)
Ωt
¸
= Bi
∙
ηqit − (λit + ωt)
Φ (qit)
Ωt
¸
.
With a constant money growth rate mt+1 = γmt, the value of money declines at
the growth rate of money: mt+1ωt+1 = mtωt. Thus the euler for money gives
γωtmt = βωt+1mt+1 + βBfλft+1mt+1. Rearranging,
Bfλft = Biλit = γ − ββ ωt . (23)
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Due to the restriction γ ≥ β, λjt ≥ 0, j = f, i and the cash-and-carry constraints
bind in all transactions:
mjt
bjt
ωt = q
φ
jt , j = f, i . (24)
Substituting (23) and (24) in the three conditions and imposing symmetry (ωt = Ωt
and Qjt = qjt, j = f, i etc), we have:
1− τ = γ − β (1− Bf)
βBf ωt
mft
bft
φ
qft
(15)
η =
γ − β (1− Bi)
βBi ωt
mit
bit
φ
qit
(16)
Bf
∙
(1− τ) qft −
γ − β (1− Bf)
βBf ωt
mft
bft
¸
= Bi
∙
ηqit −
γ − β (1− Bi)
βBi ωt
mit
bit
¸
.
Simplifying this last condition using (15) and (16) gives:
mit
bi
mft
bf
=
γ − β + βBf
γ − β + βBi . (17)
At the government side (18) follows easily from (9) and (10). The derivation of
the ratios are explained in the paper. The ratio of (15) and (16) gives:
Bi
Bf =
1− τ
η
qft
qit
. (25)
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Simplifying further gives
³
si
bi
´1−α
/
³
sf
bf
´1−α
= 1−τη
qft
qit
; or:
bi
bf
=
si
sf
∙
η
1− τ
qit
qft
¸ 1
1−α
. (26)
Notice that R = bibf
Bi
Bf
qit
qft
, which involves the product of (25), (26) and RI . The
outcome is (19). Finally, (21) follows from (17) and (22) from (18).
In the equivalent model with centralized market clearing and cash-in-advance,
the household’s problem is
v (mt) = max
cjt,ljt,mjt,mt+1,j=f,i
(1− τ) cft + ηcit − Φ (lft)− Φ (lit) + βEv (mt+1)
+λft [mft − pftcft] + λit [mit − pitcit]
+ωt [mt +Wftlft +Witlit − pftcft − pitcit +Πft +Πit −mt+1] ,
where ljt is labour,Wjt the wage rate and Πjt is firm profit in sector j. Firms solve
Πjt = max
ljt
pjtq (ljt)−Wjtljt , j = f, i, where q (ljt) = ljt. The government budget
constraint is G = τcft + Q
g
t , where Q
g
t = (γ − 1) Mtpft . Market clearing requires
that qft = cft + Q
g
t and qit = cit. Given the linear nature of the firm’s problem,
the auctioneer sets pjt = Wjt, while the first order conditions of the household’s
problem are λft = λit, 1−τ = (λft + ωt) pft, η = (λit + ωt) pit and ωtWjt = Φ0 (ljt).
In equilibrium:
pit
pft
=
η
1− τ ,
qit
qft
=
∙
η
1− τ
¸ 1
φ−1
.
A summary comparison of the models is in Table 4.
[ Table 4 ]
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Data
1. Data on the relative size of the underground economy (R) was retrieved from
Schneider and Enste (2000). The other ratios, RI and pipf , are derived using
these values of R and formulas outlined in section 4.
2. Figure 3 does not show country names against the data points due to over-
crowding. The data is available upon request. The regression ∆UE =
β0 + β1∆γ gives β0 = 1.2486, β1 = 0.0872, R2 = 0.0007 and p-values of
0.7913 and 24.9586 respectively.
3. In Table 5, simulations with pit > pft must be read with caution. As ex-
plained in section 4, the relevant price ratio is pitpft (1− τ), which is less than
unity in all cases.
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TABLE 1
PERU
Parameters Economic Indicators Target
Period β φ α s b Mt τ γ12−1 R
1 Month .997 1.2 .5 1 6.8
23.9 1 12.71% 2.24% 44%
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TABLE 2
CALIBRATION OUTCOMES
η 1 .85
Peru US Peru US
bi
b .3351 .0897 .2999 .0773
si
s .0920 .0253 .3699 .1303
mit
mt
.5285 .1609 .2680 .0590
Bi .9824 .9947 2.0820 2.4335
Bf 2.1908 1.9400 1.7786 1.8202
qi .3921 .3913 .3972 .3975
qf .2014 .2247 .4528 .5060
RI 1.9466 1.7411 .8773 .7855
R .4400 .0880 .4400 .0880
pit
pft
(1− τ) .9973 .9974 .8503 .8506
Qg .0001 .0001 .0001 .0002
G .0107 .0122 .0205 .0261
In percentages
Qg
G .39 .66 .58 .60
G
bfBf qf 12.78 10.8 12.76 10.79
G
bfBf qf+biBiqi 8.88 9.93 8.86 9.92
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Table 3
Peru: Optimal Policy
η 1 .85
% %
eγ12−1 42.69 1.48
eτ (eγ) 9.98 12.47
%∆cγ -14.09 -.049
Qg
G 9.18 .266
Qg
bfBf qf+biBiqi .78 .023
R 28.53 42.72
Matching Rates (not in %)
Bf 2.0501 1.7701
Bi 1.1592 2.1057
Inflation Data %
1976-1995 (average) 525
2005 1.6
Optimal Inflation by: %
Nicolini (1998) 14.95 to 3.54
Koreshkova (2006) 60
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